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1 Introduction
Theeconomies oftheOECDcountries havedevelopedfromminimalist states,
relying mainly on indirect taxation, to modern welfare states. Income taxes
were introduced at the end of the 19th century, and quickly increased in im-
portance. The growing pressurefor redistribution and the need to raise more
revenues by the ﬁrst world war induced a rise in the relative share of income
taxation. This process continued during the depression in the early 1930s
and the second world war. Although social insurance taxation had already
been introduced at the start of the twentieth century in most countries, the
massive rise in revenues from this source began with the build up of the wel-
fare state in the 1960s. Due to the heavy reliance on visible taxes, the share
of indirect taxation began to rise again after the 1960s, especially since the
introduction of VAT (Peters 1991).
Signiﬁcant differences in the design of revenue systems and in the use of
tax instruments exist among developed nations. Traditionally, public ﬁnance
hasfocusedon normativequestions, oftenwithin aframeworkthatmakesno
allowance for political institutions (Hettich and Winer, 1997). However, it is
difﬁcult – if not impossible – to explain actual tax systems on the basis of
this approach (alone). More recently, some studies have suggested the im-
portance of political and institutional factors in explaining the presence of
very complex tax structures. Winer and Hettich (1998) point out that omis-
sion of collective choice prevents the analyst from understanding the central
role of political equilibrium in the analysis of taxation. So far, however, these
studies have not yielded a fully developed framework that allows for em-
pirical testing. We therefore propose various hypotheses that relate the tax
structure to some political-institutional explanatory variables. The hypothe-
ses are tested by applying panel data analysis on a large sample of OECDVOLKERINK AND DE HAAN 3
countries for the period 1965 to 1995.
Explanations for existing variations in the tax mix have received only
scant attention in the literature, which is rather surprising, given the im-
portance nowadays of tax reforms that often boil down to changing the tax
mix. Furthermore, various recent studies have suggested that the tax mix
affects economic performance. Mendoza et al. (1994), for example, ﬁnd that
the tax rate on capital income is generally negatively correlated with invest-
ment, whereas high consumption and labour income taxes coincide with less
hours worked. A high level of taxes on labour income is believed to increase
unemployment. According to Daveri and Tabellini (1997) labour taxes have
a strong positive effect on unemployment in Europe. The observed rise of
about 9 percentage points in the labour tax rate corresponds to a rise in
unemployment of about 4 percentage points. Widmalm (1998) ﬁnds that a
higher relative reliance on (progressive) income taxation has a negative im-
pact on economic growth. Other variables (wage taxes, consumption taxes,
corporate income taxes and property taxes) do not have a negative impact
on growth.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers a review of trends
in tax levels and the tax mix. The third section provides a review of the
scant literature in this ﬁeld, while in section 4 our models and hypotheses
areformulated. Section 5 shows the empirical results. The ﬁnal section offers
some concluding comments.
2 The tax ratio and the tax mix
This section describes some general patterns concerning the tax ratio (total
taxes in relation to GDP) and the tax structure in OECD countries between4 POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF THE TAX MIX
Figure 1: Tax-to-GDP ratios in OECD Countries, 1965-1995
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1965and 1995. We start with the total tax ratio.1 Figure 1 presents the ratio of
total taxes to GDP in 1965 (grey shaded) and the increase towards its level in
1995. The countries are ranked according to the tax ratio in 1995. It follows
from Figure 1 that in 1965 a number of less industrialised European coun-
tries (Greece, Portugal, Spain) and Japan had the lowest tax ratios, whereas
some non-European countries (Australia, Canada, US) plus Switzerland had
medium total tax ratios. Most industrialised European countries had high
1One important caveat has to be made when tax ratios of various countries are compared.
So-called tax expenditures are the most important incomparability in quantitative terms in tax
burden comparisons. One country may place a heavy reliance on tax expenditures (subsidies
paid out via the tax system) whilst another may rely predominantly on direct expenditures to
achieve similar goals (Messere, 1993).VOLKERINK AND DE HAAN 5
ratios. In 1995 all countries had a higher tax burden than in 1965. However,
compared to 1965 the distribution pattern has changed somewhat in 1995.
The most notable difference is the position of the less industrialised Euro-
pean countries. The total tax ratios in these countries have come to exceed
those of Australia, Japan, Switzerland and the United States.
Comparing data of only two years may distract attention from changes
over time. Table 1 therefore shows the level of taxation for 1965, 1970, 1975,
1980,1985,1990and 1995. The ranking of the countries is shown in parenthe-
ses. It follows fromTable 1 that the averagetotal taxburdenacross the OECD
(both weighted and unweighted) has continued to rise until the mid 1990s.
However, the rate of increase in the 1980s and early 1990s was less than that
of the 1970s. Moreover, in some countries the tax burden fell between 1985
and 1995. For instance, in Sweden the tax ratio dropped considerably, albeit
that the ranking of Sweden is still very high. It also follows that the tax ratio
in the Southern European countries started to rise only during the 1980s. Fi-
nally, it is interesting that apart from Greece, Portugal, and Spain the ranking
of some other countries also changed considerably. In comparison to 1965,
Belgium, Denmark and Finland moved upwards – i.e. their relative tax ra-
tio increased –, while the ranking of Germany, Iceland, the UK and the US
is substantially lower in 1995 than in 1965, although their absolute total tax
ratios increased over the period.
So in conclusion, it follows from Table 1 that there has been much diver-
sity in the movement of countries’ particular tax ratios over the last 30 years
with relatively little change in some countries and violent changes in others.
It is one of the purposes of the paper to examine which factors might explain
this variation across countries and within countries over time.
Over the last three decades around 85 per cent of revenues usually came
from three sources: personal income taxes, social security contributions and6
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Table 1: Tax level as a percentage of GDP 1965-1995
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Denmark 30.83% (7) 40.39% (2) 41.35% (5) 45.48% (5) 49.03% (2) 48.73% (2) 51.48% (1)
Sweden 36.10% (2) 40.58% (1) 43.88% (2) 49.36% (1) 50.31% (1) 55.59% (1) 49.69% (2)
Finland 30.13% (11) 32.18% (11) 35.31% (11) 32.95% (13) 37.38% (11) 45.39% (3) 46.49% (3)
Belgium 30.28% (10) 35.29% (8) 41.06% (6) 43.50% (6) 47.50% (3) 44.83% (3) 46.47% (4)
France 36.53% (1) 35.43% (7) 37.04% (8) 41.71% (7) 44.46% (5) 43.71% (6) 44.48% (5)
Luxembourg 30.60% (9) 31.99% (12) 42.88% (4) 45.99% (3) 45.35% (4) 43.35% (7) 43.99% (6)
The Netherlands 35.06% (3) 39.81% (3) 43.66% (3) 45.82% (4) 44.13% (6) 44.58% (5) 43.96% (7)
Austria 34.46% (4) 35.67% (6) 38.64% (7) 41.17% (8) 43.05% (8) 41.28% (9) 42.43% (8)
Norway 33.56% (5) 38.98% (4) 44.82% (1) 47.09% (2) 43.38% (7) 41.80% (8) 41.54% (9)
Greece 19.37% (20) 23.97% (20) 24.64% (21) 29.38% (17) 35.12% (13) 37.53% (12) 41.40% (10)
Italy 27.25% (12) 27.91% (15) 25.14% (19) 29.97% (16) 34.52% (14) 39.12% (10) 41.31% (11)
Germany 32.73% (6) 32.80% (9) 35.73% (9) 38.00% (9) 38.11% (9) 36.66% (14) 39.18% (12)
New Zealand 24.88% (16) 26.69% (17) 31.29% (13) 33.03% (12) 33.25% (16) 37.65% (11) 38.16% (13)
Canada 26.84% (13) 32.67% (10) 33.84% (12) 32.83% (14) 33.87% (15) 36.81% (13) 37.78% (14)
United Kingdom 30.78% (8) 37.69% (5) 35.45% (10) 35.32% (10) 37.81% (10) 36.51% (15) 35.46% (15)
Portugal 19.12% (21) 25.63% (18) 24.72% (20) 28.69% (20) 27.82% (23) 31.01% (21) 34.92% (16)
Spain 14.73% (23) 17.31% (23) 19.59% (23) 24.07% (23) 28.78% (19) 34.40% (17) 33.98% (17)
Ireland 26.04% (15) 31.23% (13) 28.90% (16) 34.04% (11) 36.41% (12) 35.21% (16) 33.86% (18)
Switzerland 20.71% (19) 23.81% (21) 29.61% (14) 30.78% (15) 32.00% (17) 31.50% (19) 33.70% (19)
Iceland 26.20% (14) 27.00% (16) 29.60% (15) 29.20% (18) 28.43% (20) 31.43% (20) 31.19% (20)
Australia 22.26% (18) 25.38% (19) 27.76% (17) 28.76% (19) 29.93% (18) 30.76% (22) 30.53% (21)
Japan 18.23% (22) 19.45% (22) 21.52% (22) 26.00% (22) 27.96% (22) 31.52% (18) 28.83% (22)
United States 24.70% (17) 28.44% (14) 27.48% (18) 28.58% (21) 28.24% (21) 27.67% (23) 28.49% (23)
Unw. Av. 27.45% 30.88% 33.21% 35.73% 37.25% 38.57% 39.10%
Weight. Av. 26.53% 29.16% 29.45% 31.63% 32.65% 33.38% 33.63%
Note: weighted average by PPP value of GDP, data for 1970-1995, OECD National Accounts, for 1965-1969, Summers and Heston, Penn
World Tables, 5.6. The ranking is shown between brackets.VOLKERINK AND DE HAAN 7
Figure 2: Tax-mix as a percentage of GDP, weighted by PPP-value of GDP, 23
OECD countries, 1965-1995
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consumption taxes (Messere, 1993). In our analysis of the tax mix, we there-
fore focus on these three categories.2 The remaining taxes are included in the
rest category.
There are two ways to describe developments in the tax mix, depend-
ing on whether GDP is used as scaling factor or total tax revenues. In this
paper we use GDP as scaling factor. The OECD generally only publishes
unweighted ﬁgures, but this of course implies that Luxembourg, say, gets
the same weight as the US. We therefore prefer weighted averages. Figure 2
shows the weighted average of the shares of the four types of tax revenues
singled out above, using GDP as scaling factors.
2However, in recent discussions on (reforms of) tax systems is has very often been argued
that due to tax competition the ability of governments to tax mobile bases has become more
difﬁcult over time. This trend, so it is said, will only increase in the future. Property is gener-
ally considered to be immobile, so one would expect the relative importance property taxes to
increase over time. The data do not show this pattern, however.8 POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF THE TAX MIX
Based on unweighted OECD averages, Messere (1993) argued that be-
tween 1965 and 1975 there was a considerable increase in the personal in-
come tax and/or social security ratio in most OECD countries, accompanied
by a scarcely changing tax ratio of taxes on goods and services. After the
mid-seventies, however, general consumption tax ratios tended to increase.
It follows from Figure 2 that this pattern is also visible, albeit less clearly, if
weighted data are used. No matter whether weighted or unweighted data
are used, the growth in social security contributions is quite remarkable; by
1995 they nearly raised as much revenue as the personal income tax. This
shift probably reﬂects the growing pressures on social security expenditure
from higher levels of unemployment, the ageing of the population and other
social changes (Owens, 1997).3
In the 1980s many countries had some kind of tax reform. The most
profound of the recent developments in tax reform was the dramatic and
widespread reduction in marginal income tax in the 1980s, reﬂecting a re-
duction of the number of tax brackets, increased exemptions and adjusted
thresholds. To broaden the base of the income tax more elements were re-
garded as income and some tax expenditures were eliminated. While top
rates of the personal income tax have come down, revenues have not fallen
anywhere near. In 1995, personal income tax revenues were 11.7 percent of
GDP across the OECD area, compared with 11.3 percent in 1980. The reason
is that many governments ﬁnanced rate cuts with substantial base broad-
ening (Owens, 1997). Countries with developed tax systems discovered it
was difﬁcult to expand the base of the income tax further, so two additional
strategies emerged. One was to change thetaxmix by switching to consump-
tion taxes and higher social security taxes to supplement the income tax. The
3Although not shown in the ﬁgure, it is also interesting to note that the property tax ratio
declined somewhat during the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s; afterwards the share of
property taxes in GDP rose to about its level in 1965.VOLKERINK AND DE HAAN 9
other was a renewed interest in enhancing the administration of the taxes
(Owens, 1997).
There is not only variation over time, also between countries the share of
the three most important taxes differs considerably. Tables 2A-2C show the
sharesof the three most important revenuesources in all OECD countries be-
tween 1965-1995,again using GDP as scaling factor. It follows from table 2A
that in 1995personal income taxation as a share of GDP ranges between 4.9%
(Greece)and 27.7%(Denmark). Here again some notable changes in terms of
ranking occurred between 1965 and 1995. Whereas Belgium, Canada, Italy,
and Ireland moved upwards – that is got relatively higher tax ratios – Aus-
tria, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and the UK got a considerably
lower ranking.
Table 2B reinforces the conclusion with respect to social security contri-
butions which rose between 1965 and 1995 in all countries except Denmark,
where social security was increasingly ﬁnanced through other taxes. Also
note that Australia and New Zealand do not levy social security contribu-
tions at all. Notable changes in relative terms took place in Finland (up-
wards), and Luxembourg, Norway, and the UK (downwards).
It follows from table 2C that notable changes in ranking with respect to
the ratio of taxes on goods and services occurred in Greece, Portugal, New
Zealand, Spain (upwards) and in Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Italy, (downwards).
3 Review of the literature
Most of the literature on taxation is based on ‘optimal taxation’ principles.4
Ramsey (1927) was one of the ﬁrst to derive optimality conditions for com-
4Musgrave (1969) has written extensively on the structure of the tax system, but mainly in
the context of developing countries.1
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Table 2: Taxation as percentage of GDP in 23 OECD countries, 1965-1995
A Personal income taxation as a percentage of GDP 1965-1995
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Denmark 11.81% (2) 20.76% (1) 23.12% (1) 23.55% (1) 24.61% (1) 25.61% (1) 27.65% (1)
New Zealand 9.83% (4) 11.34% (6) 16.99% (4) 20.35% (2) 19.90% (2) 17.77% (3) 23.13% (2)
Sweden 16.14% (1) 20.24% (2) 20.25% (2) 20.26% (3) 19.38% (3) 21.41% (2) 17.53% (3)
Finland 9.67% (6) 13.47% (4) 17.01% (3) 14.73% (5) 17.57% (4) 17.49% (4) 16.19% (4)
Belgium 6.31% (14) 8.58% (12) 13.11% (7) 15.29% (4) 16.22% (5) 14.26% (6) 14.62% (5)
Canada 6.18% (15) 10.58% (8) 11.11% (11) 11.20% (11) 11.93% (8) 15.08% (5) 14.11% (6)
Australia 7.56% (10) 9.41% (10) 12.00% (8) 12.64% (7) 13.62% (6) 13.22% (7) 12.39% (7)
Italy 3.03% (21) 3.07% (21) 3.81% (21) 6.91% (17) 9.23% (16) 10.28% (14) 10.81% (8)
Norway 10.61% (3) 13.81% (3) 14.15% (5) 13.18% (6) 9.66% (15) 10.95% (10) 10.75% (9)
Germany 8.20% (8) 8.73% (11) 10.79% (12) 11.26% (10) 10.92% (11) 10.10% (16) 10.70% (10)
Switzerland 6.45% (13) 7.91% (13) 10.69% (13) 10.96% (12) 11.17% (10) 10.82% (11) 10.63% (11)
Ireland 4.42% (18) 5.74% (17) 5.30% (17) 10.89% (13) 11.39% (9) 11.24% (8) 10.38% (12)
United States 7.46% (11) 10.01% (9) 9.07% (14) 10.54% (14) 10.08% (12) 10.42% (12) 10.36% (13)
United Kingdom 9.58% (7) 11.85% (5) 13.56% (6) 10.38% (15) 10.03% (13) 10.41% (13) 9.73% (14)
Iceland 5.10% (16) 5.40% (18) 6.00% (16) 6.70% (18) 5.60% (22) 8.30% (19) 9.70% (15)
Luxembourg 7.59% (9) 7.58% (14) 11.91% (9) 12.34% (8) 11.95% (7) 10.21% (15) 9.38% (16)
Portugal 4.99% (17) 6.22% (16) 4.31% (20) 5.66% (20) 7.16% (18) 7.96% (20) 9.18% (17)
Austria 7.07% (12) 7.53% (15) 8.36% (15) 9.55% (16) 9.87% (14) 8.64% (17) 8.85% (18)
The Netherlands 9.78% (5) 10.64% (7) 11.81% (10) 12.03% (9) 8.56% (17) 11.01% (9) 8.31% (19)
Spain 2.11% (22) 1.98% (23) 2.84% (22) 4.90% (22) 5.66% (21) 7.47% (21) 8.09% (20)
Japan 4.01% (19) 4.26% (19) 5.14% (18) 6.32% (19) 6.92% (19) 8.46% (18) 6.17% (21)
France 3.69% (20) 4.06% (20) 4.51% (19) 5.38% (21) 5.68% (20) 5.18% (23) 6.16% (22)
Greece 1.31% (23) 2.45% (22) 2.27% (23) 4.38% (23) 4.87% (23) 5.23% (22) 4.90% (23)
Unw. Av. 7.08% 8.94% 10.35% 11.28% 11.39% 11.81% 11.73%
W. Av. 6.87% 8.36% 8.62% 9.56% 9.61% 10.12% 9.78%
Note: The ranking is shown between brackets. Source: OECD Revenue Statistics.V
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B Social security contributions as a percentage of GDP 1965-1995
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
France 13.59% (1) 12.90% (2) 15.12% (2) 17.81% (1) 19.26% (2) 19.26% (1) 19.28% (1)
The Netherlands 10.89% (2) 13.90% (1) 16.76% (1) 17.43% (2) 19.53% (1) 16.67% (2) 18.39% (2)
Germany 9.61% (4) 9.96% (5) 11.97% (5) 13.06% (6) 13.92% (4) 13.74% (5) 15.42% (3)
Belgium 9.21% (6) 10.74% (3) 13.09% (3) 13.23% (5) 15.70% (3) 15.17% (3) 15.40% (4)
Austria 8.75% (7) 8.99% (7) 10.66% (8) 12.73% (7) 13.69% (5) 13.57% (6) 15.37% (5)
Sweden 5.63% (9) 6.12% (12) 8.56% (11) 14.21% (3) 12.47% (7) 15.14% (4) 14.46% (6)
Greece 5.16% (10) 6.25% (10) 6.70% (14) 9.66% (11) 12.49% (6) 11.67% (10) 13.90% (7)
Italy 9.31% (5) 10.54% (4) 11.53% (6) 11.39% (9) 11.98% (8) 12.88% (7) 13.08% (8)
Finland 3.54% (16) 2.89% (18) 3.05% (19) 3.14% (19) 3.39% (19) 9.87% (13) 12.85% (9)
Switzerland 4.66% (12) 5.58% (13) 8.64% (10) 9.51% (12) 10.25% (11) 10.36% (12) 12.59% (10)
Spain 4.16% (13) 6.48% (8) 9.30% (9) 11.69% (8) 11.89% (9) 12.18% (8) 12.31% (11)
Luxembourg 9.85% (3) 9.32% (6) 12.67% (4) 13.45% (4) 11.44% (10) 11.83% (9) 11.79% (12)
Japan 3.48% (17) 3.72% (16) 6.24% (15) 7.57% (14) 8.46% (13) 9.14% (14) 10.48% (13)
Norway 6.81% (8) 6.30% (9) 11.14% (7) 9.90% (10) 8.93% (12) 10.99% (11) 9.77% (14)
Portugal 4.02% (15) 6.21% (11) 8.54% (12) 8.47% (13) 7.21% (15) 8.42% (15) 9.43% (15)
United States 4.05% (14) 5.49% (14) 6.73% (13) 7.50% (15) 8.30% (14) 7.15% (16) 7.17% (16)
Canada 1.52% (21) 3.11% (17) 3.40% (18) 3.46% (18) 4.56% (18) 5.28% (18) 6.34% (17)
United Kingdom 4.74% (11) 5.45% (15) 6.16% (16) 5.88% (16) 6.67% (16) 6.22% (17) 6.29% (18)
Ireland 1.69% (20) 2.57% (19) 4.35% (17) 4.86% (17) 5.37% (17) 5.23% (19) 4.88% (19)
Iceland 2.10% (19) 2.20% (20) 0.80% (20) 0.60% (21) 0.70% (21) 1.00% (21) 2.50% (20)
Denmark 2.76% (18) 0.49% (21) 0.55% (21) 0.82% (20) 1.86% (20) 1.50% (20) 1.60% (21)
Australia 0.00% (22) 0.00% (22) 0.00% (22) 0.00% (22) 0.00% (22) 0.00% (22) 0.00% (22)
New Zealand 0.00% (23) 0.00% (23) 0.00% (23) 0.00% (23) 0.00% (23) 0.00% (23) 0.00% (23)
Unw. Av. 5.46% 6.05% 7.65% 8.54% 9.05% 9.45% 10.14%
W. Av. 5.56% 6.55% 8.11% 9.05% 9.78% 9.53% 10.03%
Note: The ranking is shown between brackets. Source: OECD Revenue Statistics.1
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C Taxation on goods and services as a percentage of GDP, 1965-1995
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Greece 9.16% (15) 12.21% (9) 11.91% (8) 12.12% (9) 15.00% (5) 16.50% (1) 16.78% (1)
Denmark 12.48% (7) 15.64% (4) 13.91% (4) 17.00% (2) 16.77% (2) 16.38% (2) 16.70% (2)
Norway 13.61% (3) 16.45% (2) 16.85% (2) 16.68% (3) 16.27% (3) 14.86% (5) 16.03% (3)
Iceland 16.40% (1) 16.60% (1) 18.60% (1) 17.50% (1) 17.40% (1) 16.20% (3) 15.20% (4)
Portugal 7.66% (16) 10.24% (16) 10.07% (13) 12.88% (6) 11.91% (10) 13.59% (8) 15.20% (5)
Ireland 13.72% (2) 16.36% (3) 14.67% (3) 14.88% (4) 16.17% (4) 14.88% (4) 13.80% (6)
Finland 13.11% (5) 13.31% (6) 12.10% (7) 12.81% (7) 13.53% (7) 14.81% (6) 13.79% (7)
New Zealand 6.89% (19) 7.37% (18) 7.58% (18) 7.36% (19) 7.70% (20) 12.64% (10) 12.70% (8)
United Kingdom 10.18% (13) 10.78% (12) 9.00% (15) 10.37% (14) 11.80% (11) 11.26% (14) 12.31% (9)
France 13.46% (4) 13.45% (5) 12.17% (6) 12.69% (8) 13.19% (9) 12.42% (11) 12.14% (10)
Sweden 11.50% (8) 11.41% (10) 10.68% (11) 11.85% (10) 13.31% (8) 13.88% (7) 12.07% (11)
Belgium 11.36% (9) 12.35% (8) 10.85% (9) 11.40% (12) 11.69% (12) 11.69% (13) 12.03% (12)
The Netherlands 9.66% (14) 11.01% (11) 10.55% (12) 11.57% (11) 11.32% (13) 11.77% (12) 12.03% (13)
Luxembourg 7.55% (18) 6.56% (19) 8.95% (16) 9.70% (16) 10.87% (14) 10.76% (16) 11.94% (14)
Austria 12.89% (6) 13.29% (7) 13.34% (5) 12.98% (5) 14.02% (6) 13.00% (9) 11.75% (15)
Italy 10.59% (11) 10.64% (13) 7.38% (19) 7.93% (18) 8.76% (18) 10.96% (15) 11.26% (16)
Germany 10.41% (12) 10.42% (14) 9.68% (14) 10.30% (15) 9.77% (16) 9.80% (17) 10.89% (17)
Spain 6.02% (21) 6.21% (21) 4.73% (22) 4.98% (21) 8.26% (19) 9.76% (18) 9.74% (18)
Canada 11.10% (10) 10.32% (15) 10.83% (10) 10.68% (13) 10.77% (15) 9.52% (19) 9.65% (19)
Australia 7.64% (17) 8.09% (17) 8.01% (17) 8.94% (17) 9.76% (17) 8.56% (20) 8.92% (20)
Switzerland 6.31% (20) 6.41% (20) 5.88% (20) 6.28% (20) 6.06% (21) 5.76% (21) 6.22% (21)
United States 5.33% (22) 5.37% (22) 5.08% (21) 4.76% (22) 5.01% (22) 4.79% (22) 5.10% (22)
Japan 4.94% (23) 4.52% (23) 3.72% (23) 4.25% (23) 3.92% (23) 4.17% (23) 4.37% (23)
Unw. Av. 10.09% 10.83% 10.29% 10.86% 11.45% 11.65% 11.77%
W. Av. 7.73% 7.82% 7.05% 7.28% 7.58% 7.58% 7.87%
Note: The ranking is shown between brackets. Source: OECD Revenue Statistics.VOLKERINK AND DE HAAN 13
modity taxes, namely the rate of taxation is inversely related to the elasticity
ofdemand foracommodity. The literatureon optimality conditions for other
taxes has evolved along these lines. In general the conditions for optimality
are minimization of the aggregate deadweight loss for any given tax rev-
enue or level of public expenditure (Sandmo, 1976). From an efﬁciency point
of view, a tax system is ideal if it is consistent with a Pareto optimal alloca-
tion of resources. In other words, a lump sum tax system is optimal since
it does not distort marginal conditions. It is however often ruled out, both
on efﬁciency and on equity grounds. For an overview of the theoretical de-
velopments on the tax mix, based on optimality properties, see, for example,
Stiglitz (1987), and Boadway et al. (1994).
The considerations from the optimal taxation theory however are likely
to be not the only considerations in developing a tax structure. As is well
known from the literature on the determination of budget deﬁcits, a nor-
mative analysis alone cannot provide ample explanation for reality, see, for
example, Alesina and Perotti (1995) for an overview. Political and institu-
tional factors play an important role in determining deﬁcits. There is also
some similar research on the tax mix. Among those studies are Pommerehne
andSchneider(1983),Hettich andWiner (1984and1988),Hunter andNelson
(1989), Warskett et al. (1996), and Devereux and Wen (1998).5
Pommerehne and Schneider (1983)develop and test a model of a monop-
olistic government that can inﬂuence its chance of re-election by the shape of
the tax structure. The government has an ‘incentive’ to pursue its ideological
goal. Its ability to do so is however limited by considerations of popularity.
In order to win an election, they have to favour a majority of voters. One in-
strument to inﬂuence its popularity is the shape of the tax system. The scope
of their study is limited since they focus on Australia during the seventies,
5Hettich and Winer (1997) give a short overview of the empirical literature related to the
political determination of the tax structure.14 POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF THE TAX MIX
a country with a typical institutional framework and a bipolar political sys-
tem. Still, they do come up with some interesting results. They ﬁnd that
the popularity of the government is negatively inﬂuenced by the total tax
burden and also by the share of direct taxes in total revenue. The share of
indirect taxation, that is much less visible, hardly affects popularity. Further-
more the authors test whether the government pursues its ideological goal.
They ﬁnd that right-wing governments tend to lower direct taxes and the
tax-to-GDP ratio, whereas left-wing governments tend to raise indirect taxes
and the tax-to-GDP ratio. Right-wing governments also lower indirect taxes,
whereas left-wing governments also raise direct taxes.
Hettich and Winer (1984) propose and test a model that explains the re-
liance of US states on income taxation as a percentage of total tax revenue as
an equilibrium outcome of political self-interest. The model is set up such
that political actors minimize the political costs of different kinds of taxation,
given a certain level of revenue. The political costs are made up of ﬁve dif-
ferent ‘variables’. (i) Opposition to a tax depends on the effective tax-price,
not on the nominal price. This is tested by adding the extent of tax shifting as
an explanatory variable. (ii) The higher the revenue from a speciﬁc tax base
is, the higher the opposition to that tax will be. (iii) The political costs asso-
ciated with a tax are increasing more than one-to-one as revenue rises. (iv)
The tax system in ‘competing’ units serves as a constraint on the tax system.
(v) The higher the degree of uncertainty with respect to tax revenue from a
source is, the higher the opposition to a tax on that source will be. The model
is tested on a cross section of U.S. states by a Tobit-model. The results sup-
port the model, although the coefﬁcient on the tax competition variable is
not signiﬁcant.
The theoretical model put forward by Hettich and Winer (1988) starts by
assuming that voters support the government on the basis of the beneﬁtsVOLKERINK AND DE HAAN 15
they get and the taxes they pay. The treatment of other taxpayers is irrele-
vant and the connection between their tax burden and the services provided
to them is fuzzy. Voter’s support for the government is a function of the
beneﬁt from public goods, the loss in full income from taxation and the as-
sociated deadweight loss. All variables are increasing in the tax rate. Fur-
thermore, the tax rate is proportional. The government chooses the level of
expenditures and the level of taxes so as to maximize the expected political
support, subject to the government budget constraint and subject to the be-
haviour of the economic agent to the amount of the public good provided
and the tax rates faced. The ﬁrst order conditions amount to equalization of
the marginal beneﬁt of extra expenditure to the marginal cost of additional
revenues.
Hunter and Nelson (1989)develop a model with only consumption taxes.
The price to a consumer of the tax is increasing in his consumption level of
that good and negatively related to the share of that good in total taxation.
Interest groups, like homeowners, can inﬂuence the tax structure by lobby-
ing activities and thus inﬂuence their relative price of taxation. This theoret-
ical model is used to explain the variation in reliance on sales and property
taxes andon user feesin local governments in Louisiana. The interest groups
are farmers, timber producers, landlords and wealthy homeowners. These
groups all beneﬁt from a reduction in reliance on property taxation. Other
variables used in the regressions are variables that affect the tax base and
other variables like whether or not the entity borders another state, the pop-
ulation density and the number of public hospitals. The model is tested by
OLS on a cross section of entities. The interest groups do signiﬁcantly inﬂu-
ence the share of property taxation in total revenues. Due to the scope of our
study, we do not elaborate on these points any further.
Warskett et al. (1997) also study the complexity of the tax system in a16 POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF THE TAX MIX
framework that is very much related to the one in Hettich and Winer (1988)
of political competition. Political parties struggle for ofﬁce and the presence
of administration costs in taxation and self-selection leads to a complex tax
system. One problem with the model is however that in equilibrium there
are no differences anymore between the incumbent and the opposition party.
DevereuxandWen(1998)arguethatpoliticalinstability willleadtohigher
capital taxation. They develop a very simple model where capital is the only
productive factor. In the absence of political instability, the government will
only tax capital in the initial period to ﬁnance its outlays in all other periods.
An incumbent government that faces an uncertain future will, however, tax
capital and engage in higher spending, thus running a deﬁcit, in order to re-
strict the spending options for the challenging government that is worthless
to the incumbent. Its’ successor will have to levy more capital taxes then in
the absence of political instability. Devereux and Wen ﬁnd a positive impact
of political instability on the share of government spending in GDP, and re-
ferto theobservednegativerelationbetweenpolitical instability andaverage
growth rates.
4 Models and Hypotheses
This section ﬁrst presents our considerations for including certain variables
in our empirical models for the tax ratio and the tax mix. Next we will for-
mulate the hypotheses that will be tested in the next section.
As a ﬁrst step we have tried to analyse what would happen if govern-
ment would refrain from changing tax rates, allowances, etc. in order to get
an idea which factors would affect tax receipts. Personal income tax ratios
will increase with inﬂation and real growth (Messere, 1993). Because of the
progressivity of tax schedules, taxpayers will move into higher rate bracketsVOLKERINK AND DE HAAN 17
and those with incomes previously too low to pay will be brought into the
tax net (so-called bracket creep).
AccordingtoMessere(1993),socialsecurityratiosdecreasewith inﬂation,
since in most countries there is a ceiling on earnings subject to contributions
and once this ceiling is passed the marginal rate of contributions is zero and
the average rate begins to fall. It seems likely that higher economic growth
rates will reduce the demand for social security beneﬁts and thereby reduce
social security ratios. General consumption tax ratios will remain broadly
unaffected by inﬂation6, since they are based on the value of goods and ser-
vices, but increased growth could have a positive effect through higher con-
sumption (Messere, 1993). It follows from the preceding analysis that the a
priori effects of inﬂation and real growth on the total tax ratio are undeter-
mined.
It seems likely that the participation rate – that is the part of the labour
force which is actually employed – and the share of elderly in the total popu-
lation will affect the social security ratio. The higher the participation rate,
the lower is the need for beneﬁts, while at the same time more people can
contribute to the ﬁnancing of social security. We therefore expect a negative
relationship between participation and the social security ratio. A higher
share of people of age 65 or above implies more social security beneﬁts and
therefore, cet. par., a higher ratio. If other taxes are not affected, these factors
would also affect the total tax ratio.
Messere (1993) reports that various “ﬁshing expeditions” were carried
out in the OECD and IMF to see if statistically and explanatory signiﬁcant
correlations emerged between tax levels and tax structures on the one hand,
and some other variables on the other. One question that arose is whether
6However, Messere (1993) also argues that excise ratios will decrease with inﬂation as they
are mostly levied on weight or volume. As both taxes are included in our category taxes on
goods and services, it is possible that inﬂation will not be signiﬁcant in our regressions.18 POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF THE TAX MIX
there are competing sources of tax revenue so that governments having a
high tax type A ratio in practice have a low tax type B ratio? According to
Messere (1993) two potentially competing tax ratios would be that of personal
income tax and social security contributions. He reports that in two-thirds
of OECD countries with an above average ratio in one of these levies this is
accompanied by a below average ratio in the other.
Governments of countries with small relatively open economies are often
obliged for competitive reasons to follow the lead of other countries. How-
ever, according to Messere (1993) there is not much evidence to suggest that
until now increasing economic integration has had much effect on the tax
mix of OECD countries. Still, we include a measure of openness as explana-
tory variable in all models. Countries, which are members of the European
Community, have to modify part of their tax system to conform to EC Direc-
tives. We therefore include a dummy for EC membership.
Messere (1993) also found that most countries with high total tax ratios
had high consumption tax ratios. Messere does not provide any explanation
for his ﬁndings. However, some scholars have argued that visibility of taxes
may be the relevant explanation here. Wagner (1976) reports that the degree
of complexity of a tax system is likely to blur the assessment of the degree
of extraction by the government. If the number of taxes increases, and at
the same time the associated rates go down, the overall assessment of taxes
is likely to go down. To measure the degree of complexity of the tax sys-
tem, he created a Herﬁndahl index of tax system complexity. This index is
a measure for the number of revenue categories, which indicate the degree
of complexity.7 Wagner claims that indirect taxation is in general less visible
than direct (or: income) taxation, but the degree of visibility of, for example,
7See Oates (1988) for an overview of subsequent developments in this literature. Ashworth
and Heyndels (1998) investigate the impact of political and institutional political sources for the
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VAT and sales taxes can differ depending on the method of imposition. The
same argument of course holds for direct taxation, but to a lesser extent.
So our ﬁrst hypothesis is:
(1) The higher the share of taxes in national income, the higher the share
of indirect taxes in total tax revenue will be since indirect taxes are less
visible.8
In our speciﬁcation for the other distinguished tax categories we also include
the total tax ratio as explanatory variable, as Messere also found that for
the ratios of taxes on incomes and proﬁts, and of security taxes, there is a
correlation with total tax ratios for around two thirds of countries.
Our second hypothesis relates to the political colour of the government.
Various views have been put forward in this respect:
(2a) Left-wing governments rely more heavily on indirect taxation.
A reason is that these are less visible and left-wing government in general
tend to have a higher level of tax-to-GDP ratio. However, Messere (1993)
argues that right of centre governments have generally tended to favour a
lower tax burden and consumption taxes rather than income taxes, whereas
left of centre governments have tended to favour increasing the size of gov-
ernment, accepting that this may require higher taxes and especially higher
income taxation. So, alternatively, we formulate the hypothesis as:
(2b) Left-wing governments rely more heavily on personal income taxation
and social security contributions.
8See, for example, Hettich and Winer (1984), and Cullis and Jones (1987) who report the
outcomes of a survey under UK citizens to study the degree of comprehension of UK economic
affairs. The respondents were asked to whether they knew where governments get the money
to pay for service from. Topping the list was income taxation, whereas indirect taxation was
mentioned much fewer times.20 POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF THE TAX MIX
Although it is a priori not clear what the effect of the political orientation of
government will be on the tax mix, there is a widespread belief that the tax
ratio will be higher under left of centre governments (see e.g. Messere, 1993).
It has been argued that governments that are very unstable are not able
to cut expenditures or increase taxes, and thus have a deﬁcit bias (De Haan
and Sturm, 1994). The basic reasoning in this type of models is that deﬁcits
may be an easy way out.9 In a similar way, it could be argued that increasing
taxes (or: certain taxes) is more easy than decreasing government spending
in case a government has to take ﬁscal austerity measures. Reducing govern-
ment spending requires a strong government. This may imply that unstable
regimes may have higher tax ratios. Similarly, it could be argued that unsta-
ble governments would rely more on invisible taxes. It is also argued that
minority and coalition governments have a hard time to agree upon neces-
sary expenditure cuts and therefore also run higher deﬁcits10 and similarly,
may have a higher tax burden and higher invisible taxes. So, we formulate
our third hypothesis as:
(3a) Unstable governments rely more heavily on taxation on goods and ser-
vices, and
(3b) unstable governments have a higher tax-to-GDP ratio.
We have constructed several variables to test the hypotheses 2 and 3. The
indicators right, rightr, left, and leftr indicate the presence of a right-wing
or a left-wing government. These variables are used to check for the im-
pact of the ideology of a government on the observed tax ratio and tax mix.
Right indicates the presence of a right-wing dominated government and/or
9An alternative reasoning is that deﬁcits may be used by government to reduce policy op-
tions for its successor which has different priorities; see e.g. Persson and Svensson (1989).
10Theempirical evidencepresentedbyRoubini and Sachs ontheimpact of thetypeof govern-
ment on the growth of government debt has, however, been challenged by De Haan and Sturm
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parliament, and rightr applies an even stricter deﬁnition of right-wing dom-
inance.11 The same reasoning holds for left and leftr. The variables change
and numgov indicate the degree of political instability. Numgov is the actual
number of governments present in one year, whereas the variable change is a
dummy that takes value 1 if there is any change in government for a given
year. The variables coa, min, and maj indicate the presence of a coalition
government, a minority government, and a single-party majoritarian gov-
ernment, respectively. See the Appendix for more details.
5 Empirical Results
We haveappliedaﬁxed effects paneldatamodel with weightedleast squares
estimation on a panel of 21 OECD countries.12 We use WLS because – as
the panel is unbalanced – some observations (mainly for Iceland, and the
Southern European countries) are missing. A ﬁxed effects model is usually
applied in a panel set on a sample of countries.13
First, we have tested a speciﬁcation to explain the change in tax ratio. Ba-
sic right-hand side variables are the rate of real GDP growth, and the rate
of inﬂation. This speciﬁcation is very similar to the one used in Kontopou-
los and Perotti (1998).14 We expect GDP growth to have a negative coefﬁ-
cient since it is hypothesized that it lowers both personal income taxation
11The variable right is 1 if right-wing or centre parties make up between 33.3% and 66.6% of
government; the variable rightr is 1 if there is right-wing domination in both government and
parliament.
12We have excluded the US and Switzerland from our sample because our focus is on parlia-
mentary democracies. The democratic constellation of the US and Switzerland differs so much
from the other countries that we have excluded them from our sample. For a similar reason, we
have excluded Greece, Portugal, and Spain during their non-democratic years.
13The standard FE model looks like yit = i + x0
it. The speciﬁcation we have estimated is
yit = x 0
it, and includes a vector of the political and institutional dummies. For a similar
application see Ashworth and Heyndels (1998).
14Unlike Kontopoulos and Perotti, we do not include the rate of unemployment since real
GDP growth and unemployment are highly correlated.22 POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF THE TAX MIX
Table 3: Regression results, tax ratio, basic speciﬁcation
sample sample sample sample
variable 1965-1995 1965-1973 1974-1983 1984-1995
country dummies no no no no
d  0.05 0.08 0.03 0.04
(2.29) (1.37) (0.87) (1.24)
d y -0.09 -0.05 -0.10 -0.07
(-4.20) (-1.17) (-2.81) (-2.17)
d open -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.03
(-0.46) (0.53) (-0.48) (-1.49)
Europe 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(3.45) (0.89) (2.85) (1.42)
d elderly 0.91 1.14 1.21 0.71
(3.13) (1.66) (2.20) (1.74)
d emp-pop 0.03 0.18 0.14 0.03
(1.17) (0.89) (0.84) (1.04)
 R
2 0.037 -0.136 0.047 0.053
# obs. 501 98 177 227
Note: dependent variable is the change in tax ratio (d ty), estimation is FE with WLS, outliers
are removed, t-values are shown between brackets.
and taxation on goods and services, whereas the sign of the coefﬁcient on
inﬂation is not a priori clear. We have used a speciﬁcation in ﬁrst-differences
to separate out the ﬁxed country constants. The results – not reported here
– are not very convincing. The  R2 is negative and only the coefﬁcient for
real GDP growth is signiﬁcant. Therefore, we have reestimated the model
including the following: the participation ratio, the share of elderly, a Eu-
ropean Union dummy, and the degree of openness of the economy. This
speciﬁcation yields somewhat better results. They are shown in the ﬁrst col-
umn of Table 3. Country dummies are not included as the hypothesis that
they are equal is not rejected. Outliers are removed from the sample if their
standard deviation exceeds 3 times the conﬁdence interval, but this does not
materially affect the results. The coefﬁcient of the growth rate is signiﬁcant
and has the expected sign (a minus). The coefﬁcient of the rate of inﬂationVOLKERINK AND DE HAAN 23
is signiﬁcant, and positive. The coefﬁcient of the Europe dummy (positive),
and the coefﬁcient of the share of elderly (positive) are also signiﬁcant. The
coefﬁcients of the degree of openness and of the proxy for the participation
ratio are not signiﬁcant. The  R2 is still not very high, but this is in line with
the results obtained by Kontopoulos and Perotti (1998).15.
Next, we have included our additional political and institutional vari-
ables one at a time. The results from adding these variables are in the ﬁrst
columns of Table 4. Both left- and right-wing governments have a positive
and signiﬁcant impact on the tax ratio, so have the presence of a single-party
majoritarian government and both indicators of political instability. The ef-
fect of both left- and right-wing governments on the tax ratio is puzzling,
since the effects are both positive and signiﬁcantly different from zero. A
more detailed analysis is clearly warranted. We have therefore – in line with
the arguments by Kontopoulos and Perotti (1998) – split up the sample into
three submersions. These are 1965-1973, up to the ﬁrst oil-crisis; 1974-1983,
the end of this period marks the end of the world-wide recession and the sec-
ond oil crisis; and 1984-1995, a period of ﬁscal consolidation in most coun-
tries. As Kontopoulos and Perotti (1998) argue, policymakers faced widely
different problems in these subsequent periods, and the response to these
circumstances may have been very much different. The impact of the dif-
ferent political and institutional variables, may therefore have been differ-
ent in those periods. The results for the subperiods are in columns two to
four in Table 3 and Table 4. The explained variation for the basic model in
the periods 1965-1973 and 1984-1995 increases, whereas the speciﬁcation for
1974-1983performs very badly.
15If we add the variable agri, the share of agricultural value added in total value added, a
factor introduced by Musgrave (1969), and also used by Abizadeh and Gray (1985) in their
(empirical) study of Wagner’s law, the ﬁt improves markedly. The  R2 doubles to 0.067, and the
variable agri is highly signiﬁcant, and negative as should be expected. The sign and signiﬁcance
of the other variables do not change radically.2
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Table 4: Regression results tax ratio, added variables
sample period
variable 1965-1995 dummies 1965-1973 dummies 1974-1983 dummies 1984-1995 dummies
right +/5% n +/10% n +/1% n +/1% n
rightr n n +/10% n +/1% n +/10% n
left +/1% n +/5% n +/1% n +/5% n
leftr +/5% n +/5% n +/1% n +/10% n
coa n n n n +/1% n n n
min n n n n +/1% n n n
maj +/5% n n n +/1% n n n
change +/5% n +/10% n +/1% n +/5% n
numgov +/5% n +/1% n +/1% n +/1% n
Note: n denotes no, y denotes yes, a ‘+’ denotes a positive coefﬁcient, a ‘−’ a negative one, a percentage denotes the signiﬁcance level.
Also see note to Table 3.VOLKERINK AND DE HAAN 25
The results in Table 4 indicate that the during the late sixties and early
seventies, the variables left and leftr, both indicators for the presence of a left-
wing dominated government, showed up signiﬁcantly and with a positive
coefﬁcient. Hence, left-wing governments increased taxes more than other
governments. Both change and numgov were also signiﬁcant, and positive,
indicating that frequent government changes also contributed to a higher
tax-to-GDP ratio. This effect is also present in the late eighties, early nineties
period. For the late seventies and early eighties, the model did not perform
well. With respect to the late eighties, early nineties period, both variables
indicating the presence of right-wing and left-wing governments showed up
signiﬁcantly. This is surprising, but the results are not very robust: if the
more stringent deﬁnitions of the political variables are used, the effect van-
ishes. The coefﬁcient of both indicators for political instability were signiﬁ-
cant and positive in this period.
We have also estimated the model using one-period lagged political and
institutional variables. We have done this because political changes might
not instantly affect the revenue structure, since the actions of the new gov-
ernment are restricted by the existing budget. The results are in Table 5. The
main difference to the basic regression is that the effect of right-wing govern-
ments vanishes. The other variables are robust to these changes.
In line with the speciﬁcation of Kontopoulos and Perotti (1998), we have
also experimented by including an interaction variable of the political / in-
stitutional variable with the growth rate of real GDP in the regressions. The
results from this exercise are not reported here as the results do not differ
very much from the results obtained above. In case the coefﬁcient of a vari-
able was signiﬁcant in one of the regressions, it remained so, the interaction
in that case was – in most of the cases – not signiﬁcantly different from zero.2
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Table 5: Regression results tax ratio, added lagged variables
sample period
variable 1965-1995 dummies 1965-1973 dummies 1974-1983 dummies 1984-1995 dummies
right (-1) +/10% n +/10% n n n n n
rightr (-1) n n n n n n n n
left (-1) +/10% n +/5% n n n n n
leftr (-1) +/10% n +/10% n n n n n
coa (-1) +/5% n +/1% n n n n n
min (-1) n n +/10% n n n n n
maj (-1) n n n n n n n n
change (-1) +/1% n n n n n +/5% n
numgov (-1) +/1% n +/1% n +/10% n +/5% n
Note: n denotes no, y denotes yes, a ‘+’ denotes a positive coefﬁcient, a ‘−’ a negative one, a percentage denotes the signiﬁcance level.VOLKERINK AND DE HAAN 27
Table 6: Regression results tax-mix, basic speciﬁcation
dependent variable
variable d p.i.t. d s.s.c. d t.g.s.
Country dummy no no no
d  0.006 (0.70) -0.004 (-0.62) -0.014 (-1.87)
d y -0.015 (-1.95) -0.018 (-2.81) 0.019 (2.34)
d two -0.485 (-11.72) - -
d open 0.002 (0.50) -0.003 (-0.97) -0.009 (-2.02)
d TY 0.483 (26.64) 0.274 (14.81) 0.222 (15.90)
Europe 0.000 (-0.03) 0.000 (1.91) -0.000 (-0.78)
d emp-pop - -0.009 (-1.03) -
d elderly - -0.139 (-1.51) -
d one-one - -0.245 (-7.92) -
 R2 0.57 0.34 0.31
Note: p.i.t.: personal income taxation; s.s.c.: social security contributions; t.g.s.: taxation on
goods and services. t-statistics are shown in brackets. Outliers are removed from the sample.
Estimation is by WLS to correct for unbalanced sample. Also see the note to Table 3.
Next, we have tested our hypotheses regarding the tax mix. Again, the es-
timation is by ﬁxed effect with weighted least squares to correct for the un-
balanced sample. The speciﬁcation is in line with the speciﬁcation used by
Kontopoulos and Perotti (1998). Our main results are in Table 6. Country
dummies arenot included in the regression. We have testedwhether country
dummies should be included in the regression by testing whether all country
dummies are equal. In all cases this restriction could not be rejected, at the
usual signiﬁcance level. Large outliers can affect the results from the regres-
sions and are excluded if too large. Exclusion does not materially affect the
results.
The results support our initial beliefs with respect to the (economic) vari-
ables that matter for the shape of the tax mix. With respect to the speciﬁca-
tion forpersonal income taxation, thecoefﬁcients forsocial securitycontribu-
tions, andtotal taxation have the expectedsign and aresigniﬁcantly different
from zero. The coefﬁcients on inﬂation, real growth, openness and the Eu-
rope dummy are not signiﬁcantly different from zero. With respect to the28 POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF THE TAX MIX
speciﬁcation for social security contributions, the coefﬁcients of real growth,
personal income taxation, and the total tax ratio have the expected sign and
are signiﬁcant. The other coefﬁcients are not signiﬁcant. With respect to the
speciﬁcation for taxation on goods and services, real growth, the total tax
ratio, and openness are signiﬁcant and show the expected sign. Openness
lowers reliance on taxation on goods and services. The coefﬁcients of the
other variables are not signiﬁcantly different from zero. We have included
the tax ratio as a dependent variable in all regressions on the tax mix. It is
possible that this variable picks up the impact of political and institutional
factors on the tax mix. Therefore, we have also estimated the model exclud-
ing the tax ratio as a dependent variable. This generally does not affect the
main conclusions.16
Next we have included the additional variables to test the hypotheses.
The results are in Table 7. They indicate that right-wing governments tend
to increase both personal income taxation and social security contributions,
although the effect of more pronounced right-wing governments is less sig-
niﬁcant for personal income taxation. The same effects can be observed for
both coalition and single-party majoritarian governments. The variablenum-
gov is also signiﬁcant (and positive) but the variable change is not. The results
concerning political orientation are not very surprising since, as argued in
hypothesis 2, the impact of, for example, political colour, may work in both
ways.
We have also experimented with the one-period lagged values of the po-
litical and institutional variables. (Table 8). The results show a mitigation of
the effect of right-wing governments. Most variables are still insigniﬁcant.
16It does affect the results for the speciﬁcation on taxation on goods and services in some
instances. These results do not seem to be robust, however. The coefﬁcients are either not very
signiﬁcant (only at a 10% level) or the coefﬁcients of more strict deﬁnitions (like left versus leftr)
are not signiﬁcant.V
O
L
K
E
R
I
N
K
A
N
D
D
E
H
A
A
N
2
9
Table 7: Regression results tax mix, added variables
dependent variable
variable d p.i.t. country dummy d s.s.c. country dummy d t.g.s. country dummy
right +/5% n +/5% n n n
rightr +/10% n +/5% n n n
left nnnnnn
leftr nnnnnn
coa +/10% n +/5% n n n
min nnnn − /10% n
maj +/10% n +/5% n n n
change nnnnnn
numgov +/5% n +/5% n n n
Note: n denotes no, y denotes yes, a percentage denotes the signiﬁcance level, a ‘−’ denotes a negative coefﬁcient.3
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Table 8: Regression results tax mix, added lagged variables
dependent variable
variable d p.i.t. country dummy d s.s.c. country dummy d t.g.s. country dummy
right (-1) +/5% n n n n n
rightr (-1) n n n n n n
left (-1) n n n n n n
leftr (-1) n n n n n n
coa (-1) +/10% n +/10% n n n
min (-1) n n n n −/5% n
maj (-1) +/10% n +/10% n n n
change (-1) n n n n n n
numgov (-1) +/1% n +/1% n −/10% n
Note: n denotes no, y denotes yes, a percentage denotes the signiﬁcance level, a ‘+’ denotes a positive coefﬁcient, a ‘−’ a negative one.VOLKERINK AND DE HAAN 31
The results for political instability are still puzzling, since the coefﬁcient of
one indicator is signiﬁcant and the coefﬁcient of the other is not.
We have also experimented with the inclusion of an interaction term with
the growth rate in addition to the regular political or institutional indicator
in the regressions. The results are shown in Table 9. It is indicated that in
the presence of higher growth, right-wing governments tend to raise taxa-
tion on goods and services, whereas left-wing governments tend to decease
these taxes. Coalition and single-party majoritarian governments tended to
have higher and lower social security contributions, respectively, in the face
of higher growth. Moreover, right-wing and left-wing governments tended
to treat taxation on goods and services in opposite ways if confronted with
higher growth. Right-wing governments raise indirect taxes, and left-wing
governments tend to lower these. The most important point is that the result
obtained before are robust to the addition of an interaction variable.
In order to get a better view on the underlying motions, we have split up
the sample, in line with the exercises for the tax ratio, into the periods 1965-
1973, 1974-1983, and 1984-1995. The results for the basic model are compa-
rable to the ones obtained for the full sample, hence, we do not report the
results here. The major results for the political and institutional variables
are shown in Table 10. The major changes are the mitigation of the effect of
right-wing governments for personal income taxation. The effect on social
security contributions of these governments mainly stems from the period
between the two oil crises. In this period, the main effects of the type of gov-
ernment can be found for social security contributions, whereas this position
affects personal income taxation in the ﬁrst subperiod. The effect of political
instability – as indicated by the variables change and numgov – is puzzling.
One of the variables has a positive impact on personal income taxation in the
early seventies, whereas the other has a negative impact.3
2
P
O
L
I
T
I
C
A
L
A
N
D
I
N
S
T
I
T
U
T
I
O
N
A
L
D
E
T
E
R
M
I
N
A
N
T
S
O
F
T
H
E
T
A
X
M
I
X
Table 9: Regression results tax mix, added variables and an interaction term
dependent variable
variable d p.i.t. int dummy d s.s.c. int dummy d t.g.s. int dummy
right +/5% n n +/5% n n n +/1% n
rightr +/5% n n +/5% n n n +/1% n
left nn n n n n n − /5% n
leftr nn n n n n n − /5% n
coa +/5% n n +/5% −/5% n n n n
min nn n n n n− /10% n n
maj +/10% n n +/5% +/5% n n n n
change nn n n n n n n n
numgov +/5% n n +/1% n n n n n
Note: n denotes no, y denotes yes, a percentage denotes the signiﬁcance level, a ‘+’ denotes a positive coefﬁcient, a ‘−’ a negative one.V
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Table 10: Regression results tax mix, added variables, subperiods
period
1965-1973 1974-1983 1984-1995
variable d p.i.t. d s.s.c. d t.g.s. d p.i.t. d s.s.c. d t.g.s. d p.i.t. d s.s.c. d t.g.s.
right n n n +/10% +/1% n n n n
rightr n n n n +/5% n n n n
left +/10% nnnnnnnn
leftr nnnnnnnnn
coa +/5% n n n +/5% n n n n
min nnnn − /1% n +/10% n n
maj +/5% +/10% n n +/5% n n n n
change −/ 5 % nnnnnnnn
numgov +/5% nnnnnnnn
Note: n denotes no, y denotes yes, a percentage denotes the signiﬁcance level, a ‘+’ indicates a positive number, and a ‘−’ denotes a
negative number.34 POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF THE TAX MIX
In conclusion, with respect to the hypotheses stated in section 4, hypothe-
sis 1 can be conﬁrmed. The last column of table 6 shows that the tax ratio
is highly signiﬁcant in the regression on indirect taxation (taxation on goods
and services). With respect to hypothesis 2, there does not seem to be an
inﬂuence of left-wing governments on the tax mix, whereas, with regard to
hypothesis 3, unstable governments do seem to have a higher tax ratio over
both the full sample period and especially over the ﬁrst and last subperiod.
Unstable governments do not seem to have an effect on the relative share of
indirect taxation. However, unstable regimes have a higher tax burden
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have developed and tested some hypotheses regarding the
inﬂuence of political and institutional variables on the tax ratio and on the
shape of the tax mix of OECD countries. With respect to the tax ratio, the
only effects we ﬁnd are that left-wing governments tended to increase taxes
more rapidly than other government during the late sixties and early seven-
ties, and that political instability was a source of increased taxes in the late
sixties andearly seventies andin the lateeighties and earlynineties. We have
argued that left-wing governments may tend to rely more heavily on direct
or indirect taxation. These forces may just cancel out, and this is probably
what we ﬁnd here. With respect to the tax mix, we ﬁnd that right-wing gov-
ernments tendedto increasethe shareof personalincome taxation,andsocial
security contributions, but this effect mainly stems from the period between
the two oil crises. Our main conclusion is therefore that political and insti-
tutional factors are not important explanatory factors for the actual shape of
the tax mix. And, we also conclude that the impact of political orientation ofVOLKERINK AND DE HAAN 35
government on the tax ratio is not stable over time.36 POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF THE TAX MIX
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A The Data
The data on taxes we have are from the OECD Revenue Statistics, various
issues. The panel consists of 21 OECD countries (excluding Switzerland and
the US) and covers the period 1965 to 1995. Data are available from 1975
onwards for Greece, from 1985 onwards for Iceland, from 1976 onwards for
Portugal and from 1977 onwards for Spain.
Data on the rate of unemployment, the rate of inﬂation and the rate of
growth of real GDP are from various issues of the OECD Economic Out-
look. The political data all come from Woldendorp et al. (1993) and updates
as published in the European Journal of Political Research. Missing data are
constructed using Keesing’s Archive. The deﬁnition of the POL-index is de-
rived from Roubini and Sachs (1989). The variable POL takes the value 0 if
there is a single party majoritarian government in power, 1 or 2 if there is a
coalition government in power consisting of 2 to 3 or 4 or more parties, re-
spectively, and takes the value 3 if there is a minority government in power.
From this POL variable we can construct min and maj, indicating the pres-
ence of a minority or a majority government, respectively (see also De Haan
and Sturm, 1997). The variable numgov is the total number of governments
present during one year, and is taken from Woldendorp et al. (1993). The
variable CPG takes the value 1 if there is right-wing domination in both gov-
ernment and parliament; it takes the value 2 if right-wing or centre parties
make up between 33.3% and 66.6% of government; it takes the value 3 if
centre parties make up 50% or more of government; it takes value 4 if left-
wing or centre parties make up between 33.3% and 66.6% of government;
and takes the value 5 if left-wing parties dominate the government. The dis-
tinction between left-wing, centre, and right-wing parties is also taken from
Woldendorp et al. (1993). The variable right takes the value 1 if CPG=1,2.40 POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF THE TAX MIX
Alternatively the variable rightr takes the value 1 if CPG=1. Left and leftr are
constructed similarly with values for CPG of 4, and 5, and 5, respectively.
Tables 11-13show our political and institutional dataset. From these vari-
ables, one can compute all other variables used in the analysis.
The variable agri is the share of agricultural value added in total value
added, and is taken from OECD Historical Statistics. The variable open is de-
ﬁned as the share of imports and exports in GDP, based on IMF, International
Financial Statistics. The variable emp-pop is deﬁned as the ratio of civilian
employment to the total population, and is taken from OECD Labor Force
Statistics. We include this variable since participation ratios are not available
in a satisfactory frequency.V
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Table 11: Overview of variable POL per year per country
POL 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Australia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Austria 1 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Canada 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Denmark 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3
Finland 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2
France 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1
Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Greece nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iceland −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− 11113211111
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 3 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
Italy 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 3
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1
Luxembourg 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
The Netherlands 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Norway 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Portugal nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Spain nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr 0 0 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
Sweden 3 3 3 3 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Switzerland −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
United Kingdom 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United States −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Note: deﬁnition taken from Roubini and Sachs (1989); data taken from De Haan and Sturm (1997); nr denotes not relevant, a − denotes
not available, not in sample.4
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Table 12: Overview of variable CPG per year per country
CPG 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Australia 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Austria 3 1 1 1 1 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Belgium 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Canada 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Denmark 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4
Finland 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
France 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 2 2 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1
Germany 1 1 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Greece nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 1 1 1 1 5 5
Iceland −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− 11133333331
Ireland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
Italy 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 4
Japan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
Luxembourg 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
The Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3
New Zealand 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 5 5 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1
Norway 5 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Portugal nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Spain nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Sweden 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 5
Switzerland −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
United Kingdom 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
United States −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Note: derivedfrom Woldendorpetal. (1993) andsubsequentupdates; nrdenotesnotrelevant,a −denotesnotavailable, not insample.V
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Table 13: Overview of variable numgov per year per country
Numgov 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Australia 1 3 2 3 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1
Austria 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2
Belgium 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 4 3 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
Canada 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1
Denmark 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1
Finland 1 2 1 2 1 3 3 3 1 1 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
France 1 2 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 1 1 3 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2
Germany 2 3 1 1 2 1 1 3 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 3 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1
Greece nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 2 1 1
Iceland −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− 11222121112
Ireland 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1
Italy 1 2 1 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 1 3 1 2 3 3 2 3 2 1 1 2 3 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
Japan 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 3 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 3 3 2 1 2 3 1
Luxembourg 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1
The Netherlands 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1
New Zealand 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 3 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 1 2 1 1
Norway 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1
Portugal nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr 2 1 1 2 2 3 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2
Spain nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1
Sweden 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1
Switzerland −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
United Kingdom 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1
United States −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Note: derivedfromWoldendorp etal. (1993) andsubsequentupdates;nr denotesnotrelevant,a − denotesnotavailable, notin sample.